Corruption risks in Kazakhstan's healthcare system do not emerge only at the public procurement stage — they can appear much earlier, during budget allocation, needs assessment, or decisions about which medical services the state will pay for. Economist Ruslan Sultanov writes this in the new series "Anatomy of Corruption," reports infohub.kz.

According to the author, it is a mistake to view healthcare solely as a budget expenditure item. It is a full-fledged sector of the economy, encompassing hospitals and clinics, pharmaceuticals, laboratories, medical device manufacturing, private medicine, insurance, construction, equipment, digital systems, and logistics.

According to the Bureau of National Statistics, current revenues of healthcare and social service organizations in Kazakhstan in 2025 amounted to 4.2 trillion tenge. The gross value added of this activity, according to preliminary BNS estimates, reached about 2.9 trillion tenge, or 1.8% of GDP.

At the same time, the sector's impact on the economy is broader than its direct contribution to GDP. Health determines how much and how productively people can work, and healthcare itself creates demand for medicines, equipment, technology, research, construction, and qualified specialists.

"Therefore, for me, healthcare is not a 'hole' into which the state constantly sends money," the economist notes.

Sultanov emphasizes that corruption in this area is especially costly. The loss of a billion tenge means not only the loss of budget funds but also forgone equipment, medicines, trained specialists, and ultimately the quality and accessibility of medical care.

The economist intends to examine the system at various levels — from the ministry and the region down to the hospital, chief physician, department head, doctor, and patient. He plans to separately analyze the procurement of medicines and equipment, construction, laboratories, private clinics, financing of medical services, and the business around state medicine.

According to him, each level has its own money, powers, and scarce resources — and therefore its own corruption risks.

Sultanov notes that corruption is not always associated with the direct transfer of money. A decision that creates a corruption opportunity may appear long before a tender is announced — when rules are set, funding is allocated, a manager is appointed, needs are formed, or the medical service to be paid for by the state is determined.

"I will look exactly there. Each episode — one level or one mechanism."

As part of the series, the economist intends to examine who makes the decision, what exactly they control, where the money appears, and who benefits from influencing the decision. He also promises to separately examine international practices and ways to detect such schemes.

At the same time, Sultanov emphasizes that a high price tag or the presence of a single supplier does not in itself prove corruption. The same applies to a poor management decision.

"A red flag is a reason to ask questions, not to pass a verdict."

The first episode of the series will be dedicated to the ministry. According to Sultanov, he will show how a corruption risk can arise even before the state announces its first tender.

Earlier, Kursiv wrote about how the NSC uncovered more than 200 instances of corruption over two summer months.